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Economics Department

- - - - - - - • GROUP BARGAINING POWER IN AGRICULTURE
The confusion of repeatedly changing government programs for agriculture and the persistent surpluses of many farm commodities has led many farmers to search for a fresh approach to the agricultural
problem. The agricultural problem is not an easy
thing to define, partly because it has a different appearance from the point of view of the individual
farmer than it does from the point of view of the entire industry.
THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM
-FROM TWO POINTS OF VIEW

Taken collectively the problem in agriculture stems
from a technological revolution. New agricultural
machinery, insecticides, fertilizers, feed additives, and
new varieties are some of the areas where technological improvements have enabled agriculture to increase
production faster than the demand for farm products
has increased. This has resulted in a downward pressure on prices and created forces for industry-wide
adjustments in the use of land, labor, and capital.
Actually the nation's food and fibre needs could
be produced more efficiently today if the quantities
of all resources used in agriculture were reduced. The
usual process, however, has been for capital ( equipment, fertilizer, weed-killers) to substitute for labor
and land, thus increasing the pressure to move large
quantities of these two resources out of agriculture.
Much labor, though not enough, has left the farm,
and government programs have diverted some land
from agricultural production. But agricultural income
today still has to be divided among too many resources
for per capita income in the industry to be comparable
to other industries. Income per acre of land, per unit
of labor, or capital, in agriculture will remain low as
long as more of each resource is employed in the industry than is needed to supply the nation's food and
fiber needs, including exports.
This is the aggregate or national problem. But
each farmer sees his individual problem as one of low
prices for what he sells and high prices for what he
buys. From his point of view this price-squeeze seems
to be the agricultural problem. The reason for this
price-squeeze appears to him to be his lack of bargaining power-he accepts the prices quoted to him because he individually has no power to influence them.
Although an increase in prices received would
seem to be a solution to the individual's income problem, it is not necessarily a solution when applied to
the aggregate or industry-wide income problem.
When applied to all producers, a price increase may
actually decrease the individual farmer's income due

to the resulting decrease in demand. Thus any solution which does not include industry-wide resource
adjustments is not likely to be successful.
THE FARMER FACES BIGNESS
IN BUYERS AND SUPPLIERS

Agriculture is often pointed to as an example of
nearly perfect competition-many producers selling
the same product with no one producer large enough
to have power to influence price through his decisions
to 5ell or not to sell. The seller under these conditions
has no bargaining power. The other extreme from
perfect competition is monopoly where there is only
one seller. The monopolist is presumed to be in a position to set any prices he wishes on his products-at
least it sometimes appears this way. Actually complete monopolies seldom, if ever, exist. Firms able to
influence price must be in a position to limit output
to the amount that buyers will take at that price.
The farmer sees the bigness of the firms buying
his product as well as those he buys from and this reinforces his feeling of individual helplessness without
an organization bargaining for him in the market
place. Many farmers, therefore, see the solution to
their problem in the establishment of organizations
which will give them increased bargaining power.
IS BARGAINING POWER THE SOLUTION?

This fact sheet is aimed at evaluating bargaining
power as a solution to the agricultural problem. As
pointed out earlier, the problem looks somewhat different from the aggregate or over-all industry point of
view than it does from the individual's point of view.
If farm problems are to be solved through group
action, then it is necessary to attack the aggregate
problem-in other words to bring about the total adjustment required in agriculture, including the elimination of surplus resources from the industry. Any
attack on only one phase of the problem, such as price,
cannot have more than temporary success by itself and
may in fact create other more serious problems.
DEFINITION OF BARGAINING POWER

What is bargaining power? Bargaining is the process of buyers and sellers attempting to get together
to determine a "price" for the exchange of goods or
services. If either the buyer or seller possesses any advantage in the bargaining process due to size, control
of supplies or outlets, or any special knowledge of the
market, that advantage is termed "bargaining power."
Presumably the one possesssing such power can influence the price. In a perfectly competitive situation

neither party individually is able to influence the price.
Imperfect competition, which gives rise to bargaining power, usually depends on restricted entry
into the jndustry and reducing or controlling the
number of competitors and the output of each. Bargaining power also rests on the knowledge which
each party possesses of the strength of the other party
and of the competitors of each, as well as knowledge
of the complete supply and demand situation.
THE GOVERNMENT AND BARGAINING POWER

Fundamentally, bargaining power also must depend either on permissive or direct action of government. Government either directly grants or indirectly
permits bargaining power to be acquired by a private
business. It grants and regulates franchises, establishes
tariffs on international trade, and controls or prohibits
certain kinds of monopoly.
There is a legal basis for cooperative bargaining on
the part of farmers that dates back to the Clayton Act
(1914) which exempted farmer cooperatives in some
circumstances from antitrust laws. The Capper-Volstead Act in 1922 gave cooperative bargaining by
farmers additional legal status. It would, however,
be unwise to assume that these laws will permit producer bargaining groups to go to extremes in the exercise of their power.
Some very large firms probably possess far more
bargaining power than they dare use due to fear of
government action against them. We have had recent
instances in which the price of steel was affected by
government pressure. Nebraska has passed legislation
limiting the power of agricultural bargaining groups.
Consequently agriculture cannot proceed in its acquisition and use of bargaining power without consideration of the role of government and public opinion.

grading practices and standards, for improved market
news services, and increased research information.
COMPLEXITY OF BARGAINING POWER

Bargaining power is not just a matter of numbers
of economic resources. It is really quite a complex
thing if one begins to analyze what it can and cannot
do. For instance, consider the difference between
labor bargaining for higher wages and a farm organization bargaining for a higher price for a certain
commodity. The labor which a union has for sale is
not something produced through the application of
land, labor, and capital, but is possessed by one of these
factors alone. If labor is unused it is totally lost. It
cannot be stored and thus affect future bargaining.
The labor union obtains its power from its ability to
restrict the labor supply available to the employer.
The firm, however, is usually left free to determine
the number of workers it will hire at the agreed upon
rate.
A farm product does not automatically disappear
when withheld from the market. The perishability of
the product, its storability, the number of sellers, number of buyers, knowledge possessed by bargainers,
laws permitting or regulating organized bargaining
or withholding, the acceptability and availability of
substitutes, and all the factors which determine the
nature of the supply and the demand-these are the
determinants of bargaining power.
It should be clearly understood that a bargaining
association is a purely voluntary organization. As
such, nonmembers may gain as much or more than
the members. If a regional bargaining association is
unreasonable in its demands, it will cause production
to shift to other higher-cost regions and thus benefit
the new region more than the association members.

ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING
BARGAINING POWER

HOW BARGAINING POWER IS USED

In addition to the legal status given cooperatives
to increase bargaining power, broad government agricultural programs such as we have had since the
1930's also may enhance the bargaining position of
farmers. This may be brought about through production control programs, price supports, direct market
purchases, acreage allotments, and market orders
which affect supply and demand conditions of the
market. An alternative outside the market may be
that of direct payment to producers.
The bargaining position of the individual farmer
may be enhanced by becoming better informed regarding the operations of the marketing system. The
scale and quality of his operations may be increased so
as to increase the vaiue of products sold. Less room for
discrimination may be achieved by working for better

Assuming that farmers are able through organization to acquire bargaining power, how can it or should
it be used? Possession of bargaining power is one
thing; intelligent usage of it is another. Most people
think of bargaining for a price or wage, but it can
also be used for many other things.
There could be bargaining for questions concerning marketing procedures and specifications. What
grading standards will be used and how will they be
applied? How and when will the product be picked
up from the farm? Who should speak for the industry to others? Should advertising and market development work, both domestic and foreign, be undertaken, and how should it be paid for? Who will
provide storage facilities? All of these and many other
questions might be subjects for collective bargaining.

SOURCES OF GAIN
FROM USE OF BARGAINING POWER

If bargaining power is to be successful, there must
be increasing benefits or returns to the individual producer as a result of group action. These gains must
come from some source. Actually there are only three
possible sources of gain which can be exploited by
bargaining action. It is important that these be understood, because there is no point in wasting bargaining
power in an attempt to capture gains where no potential gains exist.
The three sources of gain are:
1. Gains from efficiencies in producing, marketing,
and processing that can be achieved through group
action.

2. Gains from the "opponent" in the bargaining situation, usually a processor or marketing firm or an
organization representing part or all of these firms.
3. Gains from a third group, usually the consumer.
Probably the greatest possibility for gain in most
agricultural commodities is in number I-gains in
efficiency. Producer organizations which have concentrated on better marketing techniques, control of
product quality, cutting costs of handling and processing, and product merchandising or promotion have
usually succeeded in increasing the returns to their
members. Producers too often have resisted using
practices which would result in marketing and processing efficiencies. Extreme seasonality in milk production is an example.
If producers can agree to furnish a more uniform
product and this results in greater efficiency in marketing and processing, then they have created something that can be bargained for. Or if they furnish a
product at a better time than previously and this results in greater marketing efficiency, this gain could
go to the producers if their bargaining power is sufficient and they have the ability to fulfill their agreement.
Unfortunately the other two sources of gain, (1)
existing excess profits of the processors or marketing
firms or (2) the consumer, appear to be easier sources
to tap. The bargaining group often thinks it can either
force the opponent to divide his "excess" profits or
force him to raise the price of his product to the consumer. This is the traditional theme of bargaining
power.
If the bargaining organization is bargaining with
a single firm of an industry, this firm will not be able
to recoup from a third party anything he gives up to
to the bargaining group because of his competition.
This is a difficult situation from which to extract any
gain. The firm caught in this situation will energetically seek a new source of supply.

If the producers can succeed in achieving industrywide bargaining, then it is usually not difficult to pass
the cost of gains granted the producers on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. The problem here
is: how many producers will gain? Will consumption
decline so much that many farmers will have to go
out of production? The availability of substitutes for
many food products makes this a real possibility.
Labor unions in some cases have found that they have
had to scale down their requests for wage increases in
order to keep their employer in business and in a position to continue their jobs.
PRIORITIES IN BARGAINING PROCEDURE

If there does happen to be a source of gain from
the processors, or consumers, the first priority for a
bargaining group to achieve this gain is strict control
of the supply. If this cannot be achieved, then there is
no point in proceeding any further. For products produced nation-wide, the control must be nation-wide,
and tariffs will be necessary to protect gains from
being lost to other countries.
If strict control of supply is achieved, the second
priority is to obtain as complete knowledge of the
supply and demand situation as is possible. In most
cases the opponents in bargaining will be large
firms with very competent professional staffs keeping
their management well informed. Producer bargaining groups must be equally well informed if they are
to be successful. In addition they must understand the
role of price in our economy and the forces which
determine price.
· It is, for instance, misleading to compare the pricing of ~gricultural commodities (raw materials) with
consumer goods sold at retail. It is more logical to
compare them with the pricing of minerals and other
raw materials. The iron mining companies of Minnesota, for instance, cannot price their product at cost
plus a reasonable profit and expect to sell much today.
Steel companies have sources of iron ore which have
lower costs than Minnesota and they are unwilling
to pay a price which will make it possible for Minnesota mines to operate. If all iron mines were organized
to raise the price of iron ore, then aluminum, plastic,
and other substitutes would immediately come into
the picture and the use of iron ore would decline. The
agricultural situation is not far different from this.
THE PRICING PROCESS
IS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX

The pricing of agricultural products such as corn,
milk, wheat, and livestock is exceedingly complex.
Each product has several uses, numerous by-products,
and many substitutes, and different degrees of perishability. Each of these factors has its own peculiar effect
on pnce.

Through technology we are able to devise substitutes for almost any commodity. This is a very important factor in pricing and bargaining. Producers
can always bargain for higher prices, but a higher
price will not always result in a higher total revenue
for the producers. The effect of a higher price for
food products is determined partly by the availability
of substitutes. Some dairy products, and especially
butter, would probably suffer a considerable loss in
sales through an increase in price, forcing total revenue down. The reason would be the availability of
substitutes. Other examples are silk, cotton, and wool
and the synthetic fibres; lard and the vegetable oils;
and steel and plastics.
The effect of close substitutes for a product is to
reduce the range within which bargaining power can
be effectively used. Price becomes a less fruitful area
for bargaining under these circumstances. Producers
may have to look for means of becoming more· competitive, possibly by lowering the cost of production.
THE ROLE OF SUPPLY CONTROL IN PRICING

Many of the nonagricultural industries today have
a few large producers which dominate the industry.
This gives them an advantage in pricing not enjoyed
by agriculture. They can maintain fairly stable prices
by regulating production. Price wars may occur in
some of these industries if one of the major producers
gets out of line or if a new firm is trying to secure a
share of the market. But this system of stable prices
works only because these firms can keep almost daily
control over the volume of production. Strict regula-

tion of supply is a prerequisite to successfully administered prices.
Agriculture has often looked with envy on the
industry which can control its production and thus
maintain stable prices. One attempt of agriculture to
get at prices is through cooperatives. Actually farmers
have been successful in many cases in getting through
cooperatives better prices on the local level where lack
of competition was permitting unfair price discrimination against them. But for the staple commodities
of feed grains, wheat, and livestock products, producers have never been able, consciously as a group, to
affect the national market or price. In some areas and
with some specialty crops, farmers have succeeded in
getting control of the production of their commodities
and thus have maintained a stable price. The experience with each commodity has been different and the
degree of success has generally depended on the completeness of control and the availability of substitutes
for the product.
Agriculture undoubtedly can find ways to increase its bargaining power. Farmers are most likely
to be successful in this endeavor if they limit their
immediate objectives to increasing the efficiency of
the marketing and processing phases of their industry
and leave the price bargaining until later. When they
have achieved nearly complete control of the supply
and acquired a professional staff that will provide as
complete knowledge of supply and demand conditions as their opponents have, then they will be in a
position to consider bargaining for improved prices.

